Philosophy of Mind is concerned with fundamental issues about the relation between mind and body and mind and world, and with the nature of the diverse variety of mental phenomena, such as thought, self-knowledge, consciousness, perception, sensation, and emotion. Philosophers of mind explore some of the most perplexing questions about our mental lives. For instance:
- How exactly is the mental related to the physical?
- How is it that our thoughts can reach out to reality and refer to objects distant in time and space?
- What is consciousness? Can it be explained by science?
- How is thought related to language?
- Can animals think?
- Is there some one thing, some special property, that all mental phenomena share that distinguishes them from non-mental phenomena?
- To what extent has the computer helped us to understand the nature of mind?
- Does emotion play a larger role in our rationality that has previously been thought?
For as long as humanity has sought an understanding of its place in the universe, philosophy of mind has been at the centre of philosophy, but it flourishes now as it has never done before. This new title in the Routledge’s Major Works series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s enormous literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by Sean Crawford, a prominent scholar in the field, it is a four-volume collection of classic and contemporary contributions to all of the major debates in philosophy of mind.
With comprehensive introductions to each volume, newly written by the editor, which place the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Philosophy of Mind is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of mind—as well as those working in allied areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language; and cognate disciplines such as psychology—as a vital research tool.
PROVISIONAL CONTENTS
Volume I: Foundations
1. Bertrand Russell, ‘Mind and Matter’, Portraits from Memory (George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 142–53.
2. Franz Brentano, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena’ [1874], Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, vol. I, bk. II, ch. I, §5 (Routledge, 1995), pp. 88–91.
3. Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Description and Knowledge by Acquaintance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–11, XI, 108–28.
4. Samuel Alexander, ‘Natural Piety’, The Hibbert Journal, July 1922.
5. C. D. Broad, ‘Mechanism and its Alternatives’, The Mind and its Place in Nature (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), pp. 44–6, 50–81.
6. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ‘On the Idea of Emergence’, Part II of ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, 1948, 15, 2, 146–52.
7. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 11–24, 43–5, 134–5.
8. Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Logical Analysis of Psychology’, in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), pp. 373–84.
9. Peter Geach, ‘Ryle’s Rejection of Mental Acts’ and ‘Acts of Judgement’, Mental Acts (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 4–9.
10. Hilary Putnam, ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, vol. 2 (Basil Blackwell, 1968), pp. 1–19.
11. Roderick Chisholm, ‘Sentences about Believing’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1955–6, 56, 125–48.
12. W. V. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1956, 53, 5, 177–87.
13. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1956, I, 307–29.
14. U. T. Place, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, British Journal of Psychology, 1956, 47, 44–50.
15. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, The Philosophical Review, 1959, LXVIII, 2, 141–56.
16. Richard Rorty, ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories’, Review of Metaphysics, 1965, 19, 1, 24–54.
17. David Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’ [1966], reprinted in David Armstrong, The Nature of Mind (The Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 1–15.
18. David Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1972, L, 3, 249–58.
19. Hilary Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, originally published as ‘Psychological Predicates’, in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind and Religion (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 37–48.
20. Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 79–101.
21. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Intentional Systems’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 68, 4, 87–106.
22. Jerry Fodor, ‘Special Sciences’, Synthese, 1974, 28, 77–115.
23. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 144–55.
24. Hilary Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70, 19, 699–711.
25. Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, The Philosophical Review, 1974, LXXXIII, 435–50.
Volume II: The Mind–Body Problem
26. Ned Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1978, 9, 261–325.
27. Paul Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1981, LXXVIII, 2, 67–90.
28. Jerry Fodor, ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Aunties’s Vade-Mecum’, Mind, 1985, 94, 373, 89–95.
29. John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980, III, 3, 417–24.
30. William Lycan, ‘Form, Function, and Feel’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1981, LXXVIII, 24–50.
31. Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1989, 63, 31–47.
32. Terence Horgan, ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World’, Mind, 1993, 102, 555–86.
33. Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge (MIT Press, 1988), pp. 142–7.
34. J. J. C. Smart, ‘The Content of Physicalism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 1978, 28, 113, 339–41.
35. David Papineau, ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, in Barry Loewer (ed.), Physicalism and its Discontents (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 3–36.
36. John Heil, ‘Levels of Reality’, Ratio, 2003, XVI, 205–21.
37. Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2006, 13, 10–11, 3–31.
38. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues’, Synthese, 2006, 151, 547–59.
39. Steven Yablo, ‘The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1990, 16, 151–4, 162–70, 177–201.
40. Barbara Montero, ‘What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?’, Dialectica, 2006, 60, 4, 383–96.
41. W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1–8, 50–9, 62, 65–7, 69, 130, 135–44, 147–50, 179.
Volume III: Intentionality
42. John Searle, ‘What Is an Intentional State?’, Mind, 1979, 88, 349, 74–92.
43. Steven Schiffer, ‘Propositional Content’, in Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 267–94.
44. Tyler Burge, ‘Belief De Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1977, 74, 338–62.
45. Daniel Dennett, ‘Beyond Belief’, in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality (Clarendon Press, 1982).
46. Simon Blackburn, ‘Reference’, Spreading the Word (Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 310–28.
47. John McDowell, ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context (Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 137–68.
48. Sean Crawford, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited’, Synthese, 2008, 160, 75–96.
49. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1979, IV, 73–87.
50. Jerry Fodor, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980, III, 1, 63–72.
51. Gareth Evans, ‘Commentary on Fodor’s "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology"’, The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 1989, III, 1.
52. Brian Loar, ‘Social Content and Psychological Content’, in Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought (University of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 99–110.
53. Robert Stalnaker, ‘On What’s in the Head’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1989, 3, 287–316.
54. Barry Loewer, ‘A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics’, in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 1997), pp. 108–26.
55. Ruth Millikan, ‘Biosemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1989, 86, 6, 281–97.
56. Fred Dretske, ‘If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How it Works’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1994, 19, 468–82.
57. Donald Davidson, ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987, 441–58.
58. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 85, 649–63.
59. Michael McKinsey, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 1991, 51, 9–16.
60. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘On Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1988, 2, 183–209.
Volume IV: Consciousness
61. Gareth Matthews, ‘Consciousness and Life’, Philosophy, 1977, LII, 199, 13–26.
62. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies, 1975, XXVII, 5, 292–315.
63. Frank Jackson, ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1986, LXXXIII, 5, 291–5.
64. Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, 64, 354–61.
65. Brian Loar, ‘Phenomenal States’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 81–108.
66. Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press, 1992), pp. 97–102.
67. David Papineau, ‘Kripke’s Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists’ (www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau …).
68. Gilbert Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 31–52.
69. Ned Block, ‘Inverted Earth’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 53–79.
70. David Rosenthal, ‘State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness’, Consciousness and Cognition, 1993, 2, 355–63.
71. Fred Dretske, ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind, 1993, 102, 406, 263–83.
72. Tyler Burge, ‘Two Kinds of Consciousness’, in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 427–33.
73. Michael Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1995, 9, 223–40.
74. Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’, Mind, 1989, 98, 391, 349–66.
75. Kathleen V. Wilkes, ‘Is Consciousness Important?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1984, 35, 223–43.
76. David Chalmers, ‘Facing Up To the Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995, 2, 3, 200–19.
77. John Searle, ‘Consciousness’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 2000, 23, 557–78.
78. Daniel Dennett, ‘A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness’, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press, 2005), pp. 25–56.
79. Martin Davies, ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind, 1991, 100, 461–84.
80. Christopher Peacocke, ‘Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 2001, 98, 5, 239–64.
81. Tim Crane, ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’, in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 126–46.
Biography
Sean Crawford holds degrees from Simon Fraser University, Dalhousie University, and the University of Oxford. He has held teaching and research posts at the University of Birmingham, the Open University, Lancaster University, and is currently Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Manchester. His previous publications include: Aspects of Mind (Open University, 2005); ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited’, Synthese (forthcoming, 2007); ‘Object-Dependent Thoughts’ and ‘Propositions’, The Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd edn., Elsevier (2005); ‘Pure Russellianism’, Philosophical Papers, 33.2 (2004); ‘A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle about Belief’, Analysis, 64.3 (2004); ‘Causal Powers, Relational Properties and Psychological Laws’, Acta Analytica, 18.30–1 (2003); and ‘In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98 (1998).
