1st Edition

Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States Organizational Response to Market Inefficiencies

By Helmut Dietl Copyright 1998

    Why did financial keiretsu develop in Japan, but not in Germany and the United States? Why is bank intermediation more dominant in Germany and Japan than in the United States? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each system?
    Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States answers these and related questions. Helmut Dietl explains capital market intermediation, holding companies, multidivisional organizations, financial keiretsu, and LBO associations as organizational responses to capital market inefficiencies. Country-specific responses are described as a consequence of country-specific financial regulations. Each regulatory regime results in specific capital market inefficiencies. Comparative capital market and corporate data highlight the major strengths and weaknesses of each system. This book provides a comprehensive and innovative analysis of German, Japanese and U.S. regulations.

    Introduction 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Investment relation, Investment relation costs, Relevant dimensions of investment relations, Classification of alternative regulatory environments, Organizational modes of capital allocation and corporate governance, Discriminating match 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Germany, Japan, United States, Conclusion, SUMMARY

    Biography

    Helmut M. Dietl is Professor of Organization and International Management at the University of Paderborn, Germany. He is co-editor of the book series NIE—New Institutional Economics, author of Institutions and Time (in German), and co-author of Organization—An Economic Perspective (in German and Japanese). He has contributed to refereed journals and published in four languages.