Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) was one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, making major contributions in philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics. She is particularly renowned for her work on intention and action. A pupil and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anscombe showed a deep understanding of his aims and methods, while being a bold and original thinker in her own right.
Anscombe published two monographs and numerous articles in her lifetime, and left a considerable Nachlass. The monograph Intention (1957) has been hugely influential and has generated much discussion, as have such articles as ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ and ‘The First Person’. (Indeed, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ has been credited with inspiring that renewal of interest in virtues and character which came to be embodied in a whole school of thought, often called ‘Virtue Theory’.) Profound, often difficult, sometimes provocative, her work is probably unique in modern philosophy for its combination of breadth and depth.
Now, to allow researchers and advanced students to make better sense of Anscombe, her major works, and the developments it has encouraged, Routledge announces this new four-volume collection in its acclaimed Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers series. Henceforward, Anscombe scholars and students will be able easily and rapidly to locate the best and most influential critical scholarship, work that is otherwise often inaccessible or scattered throughout a variety of specialist journals and books. With material gathered into one easy-to-use set, researchers and students can now spend more of their time with the key journal articles, book chapters, and other pieces, rather than on time-consuming (and sometimes fruitless) archival searches.
Fully indexed and with a comprehensive introduction newly written by the expert editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Elizabeth Anscombe is an essential reference work and is destined to be valued as a vital research resource.
Elizabeth Anscombe
Vol. I: Intention and Action (Part 1)
1. Andrew Beards, ‘Assessing Anscombe', International Philosophical Quarterly, 185, 7, 1, 2007, 39-57.
2. Daniel Bennett, ‘Action, Reason, and Purpose’, Journal of Philosophy, 62, 4, 1965, 85-96.
3. David Braybrooke and Others, ‘Some Questions for Miss Anscombe about Intention’, Analysis, 22, 3, 1962, 49-54.
4. Rachel Cooper, extract from Classifying Madness (Dordrecht: Springer 2005), pp. 61-4.
5. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Features of Intentional Actions’, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 2, 1968, 232-244.
6. Keith S. Donnellan, 'Knowing What I am Doing', Journal of Philosophy, 60, 14, 1963, 401-9.
7. Kevin Falvey, ‘Knowledge in Intention’, Philosophical Studies 99, 2000, 21–44.
8. Anton Ford, ‘Action and Generality’, in A. Ford, J. Hornsby and F. Stoutland (eds), Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 76-104.
9. Peter Geach, ‘Intention, Freedom and Predictability’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 73-81.
10. Alvin Goldman, 'The Individuation of Action', Journal of Philosophy 68, 21, 1971, 761-774.
11. Thor Grunbaum, ‘Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What is Happening’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 78, 2009, 41–67.
12. Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Intention’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 83-105.
13. Benedikt Kahmen, ‘Knowing One’s Intentional Actions’, sec. 4 in 'Intention, Intentional Action and Practical Knowledge', in B. Kahmen and M. Stepanians (eds), Critical Essays on "Causation and Responsibility" (Berlin: De Gruyter 2013), pp. 259-270.
14. Joy Laine, ‘Anscombe and Wittgenstein: A Public Voice for Philosophy’, in Karen J. Warren (ed.), An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy: Conversations Between Men and Women Philosophers (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), pp. 476-489.
15. Gavin Lawrence, ‘Reason, Intention and Choice: An Essay in Practical Philosophy’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 265-300.
Vol. II: Intention and Action (Part 2)
16. Richard Moran, ‘Anscombe on "Practical Knowledge"’, in J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds), Action and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 43-68.
17. Mary Mothersill, ‘Anscombe’s Account of the Practical Syllogism’, Philosophical Review, 71, 1962, 448-61.
18. Anselm Winfried Müller, ‘Backward-looking Rationality and the Unity of Practical Reason’, in A. Ford, J. Hornsby and F. Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 242-269.
19. Anselm Winfried Müller, ‘How Theoretical is Practical Reason?’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press 1979), pp. 91-108.
20. Anne Newstead, ‘Interpreting Anscombe's Intention §32ff’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, 2009, 157-176.
21. Jeanne Peijnenburg, ‘Classical, Nonclassical and Neoclassical Intentions’, in R. Festa, A. Aliseda and J. Peijnenburg (eds), Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry (Amsterdam: Rodopi 2005), pp. 217-233.
22. A. W. Price, ‘On the So-called Logic of Practical Inference’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 119-140.
23. Bernard G. Prusak, 'Aquinas's Sheep: A Note on Anscombe on Freedom', Expositions 3, 2, 2009, 223-228.
24. Pathiaraj Rayappan, ‘Discussion of Intention after Anscombe’, in Intention in Action: The Philosophy of G. E. M. Anscombe (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 143-64.
25. Denis F. Sullivan, 'Anscombe on Freedom, Animals, and the Ability to do Otherwise', Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 81, 2007, 231-40.
26. Charles Taylor, ‘Action as Expression’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press 1979), pp. 73-89.
27. Roger Teichmann, ‘The Voluntary and the Involuntary: Themes from Anscombe’, The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 88, 3, 2014, 465-486.
28. Roger Teichmann, ‘Why "Why?"?: Action, Reasons and Language’, Philosophical Investigations, 38, 1-2, 2015, 115- 132.
29. J. David Velleman: 'What Good is a Will?', in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe (eds), Rational and Social Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 193-215.
30. Candace Vogler, ‘Anscombe on Practical Inference’, in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT University Press, 2001), pp. 437-464.
31. Burleigh T. Wilkins, ‘Concerning "Motive" and "Intention"’, Analysis, 31, 4, 1971, 139-142.
Vol. III: Ethics
32. Reshef Agam-Segal, 'A Splitting "Mind-Ache": An Anscombean Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation', Journal of Philosophical Research, 38, 2013, 41-66.
33. Maria Alvarez and Aaron Ridley, 'The Concept of Moral Obligation: Anscombe contra Korsgaard', Philosophy, 82, 2007, 543-552.
34. Jonathan Bennett, 'Whatever the Consequences', Analysis 26, 3, 1966, 83-102.
35. Simon Blackburn, ‘Simply Wrong’, in Times Literary Supplement, 30 September 2005, pp. 11-12.
36. Lucy Brown, ‘Intentions in the Conduct of the Just War’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), 133-145.
37. Christopher Coope, 'Modern Virtue Ethics' in Timothy Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 20-52.
38. Roger Crisp, ‘Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 75-93.
39. Paul R. DeHart, ‘What Is a Natural Right?’, extract in Uncovering the Constitution's Moral Design, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press 2007), pp. 209-217.
40. Nicholas Denyer, ‘Just War’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 137-151.
41. Cora Diamond, 'The Dog that Gave Himself the Moral Law', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 13, 1988, 161-179.
42. John Finnis, 'Anscombe's Essays', in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 9, 2009, 199-207.
43. John Finnis, 'Intention and Side-Effects', in Intention and Identity: Collected Essays of John Finnis, Vol. II, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 173-197.
44. Philippa Foot, ‘Transition to Human Beings’, in Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 38-51.
45. Luke Gormally, 'Intention and Side-Effects: John Finnis and Elizabeth Anscombe', in J. Keown and R.P. George (eds.), Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 93-108.
46. John Hacker-Wright, ‘Virtue Ethics without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and Contemporary Virtue Ethics’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 44, 2010, 209–224.
47. Chad Kleist, 'Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy": a Millian Response', Kinesis 36, 1, 2009, 4-20.
48. Sabina Lovibond, ‘Absolute Prohibitions without Divine Promises’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 141-158.
49. Christopher Martin, ‘Virtues, Motivation and the End of Life’, in Luke Gormally (ed.), Moral Truth and Moral Tradition (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), pp. 111-132.
50. Onora O’Neill, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 301-316.
51. Dewy Z. Phillips, 'Moral Practices and Anscombe's Grocer', in Interventions in Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 14-17.
52. Thomas Pink, ‘Moral Obligation’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 159-185.
53. Jenny Teichman, ‘Intention and Sex’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds), Intention and Intentionality, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 147-161.
54. Michael Thompson, ‘The Representation of the Living Individual’, in Life and Action (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 49-62.
55. Michael Thompson, ‘The Representation of the Life Form Itself’, in Life and Action (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 63-82.
56. Robert J. Richman, 'Miss Anscombe's Complaint', Journal of Value Inquiry, 10, 1, 1976, 35-52.
57. Duncan Richter, ‘Sex’, in Anscombe's Moral Philosophy, (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington, 2011), pp. 139-166
58. C. Stephen Evans, ‘The Unique Character of Moral Obligation: The Anscombe Institution’, extract in God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 9-19.
59. Peter Winch, Bernard Williams and Michael Tanner, G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Discussion of "Contraception and Chastity"’, in M. D. Bayles (ed.), Ethics and Population (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 154-163.
60. Candace Vogler, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106, 3, 2006, 347-362.
Vol IV: The First Person, Causality, etc.
61. Anselm Müller, 'G.E.M. Anscombe (1919-2001)', in Aloysius Martinich and David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytical Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 315-25.
Part 1: The First Person
62. James Altham, ‘Indirect Reflexives and Indirect Speech’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 25-37.
63. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Indirect Reflexive’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 39-53.
64. Edward Harcourt, ‘The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 25-46.
65. Anthony Kenny, ‘The First Person’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 3-13.
66. Norman Malcolm, ‘Whether ‘I’ is a Referring Expression’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 15-24.
67. Harold Noonan, ‘Identity and the First Person’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 55-70.
68. Lucy O'Brien, ‘Arguments for the No-Reference View of "I"’, in Self-Knowing Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 15-28.
Part 2: Perception and Sensation
69. Clive V. Borst, 'Perception and Intentionality', Mind 79, 1970, 115-121.
70. Tommy L. Lott, 'Anscombe on Justifying Claims to Know One's Bodily Position', Philosophical Investigations 12, 1989, pp. 293-307.
71. Norman Malcolm, ‘The "Intentionality" of Sense-Perception’, Philosophical Investigations 6, 3, 1983, pp. 175–183.
72. Douglas Odegard, 'Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects', Dialogue 11, 1972, 69-77.
73. G. N. A. Vesey, 'Miss Anscombe on the Intentionality of Sensation', Analysis 26, 3, 1966, 135-137.
Part 3: Causality
74. Nancy Cartwright, ‘Causal Diversity; CausalStability’, in The Dappled World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 104-136.
75. Christoph Hoerl, 'Causal Reasoning', Philosophical Studies, 152, 2011, 167-179.
76. Stephen Makin, ‘Causality and Derivativeness’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 59-71.
77. Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., 'Rethinking Anscombe on Causation', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 1, 2007, 89-107.
Part 4: Language and Belief
78. G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Making True’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-8.
79. Michael Dummett, ‘Sentences and Propositions’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 9-23.
80. Cora Diamond, ‘Disagreements: Anscombe, Geach, Wittgenstein’, in Philosophical Investigations, 38, 1-2, 2015, pp. 1-24.
81. Cora Diamond, 'Reading the Tractatus with G.E.M. Anscombe', in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 870-905.
82. Kelly Dean Jolley, ‘Valbergian Impropriety’, extract in The Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual Investigations, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 51-62.
83. Dewey J. Hoitenga, ‘Faith: Human and Devine’, extract in Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 40-46.
84. Roger Teichmann, ‘Authority’, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 229-243.
85. Jeremy Wanderer, 'Anscombe's "Teachers"', Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 47, 2, 2013, 204-221.
