Philosophers since Descartes have felt themselves compelled to make a choice between mind and body. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mind, first published in 1986, argues that there is no genuine epistemological problem of mind, and that the widespread philosophical scepticism with regard to our knowledge of other minds is without foundation. Ashok Vohra applies Wittgenstein’s method to show that the problem has arisen through a tendency to over-philosophise our simple experiences.
Vohra presents a positive account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, arguing that to consider his philosophy entirely destructive is misleading. He shows that knowledge of mind is gained through a large complex of intersubjectively identifiable factors such as the linguistic and non-linguistic past, present and future behaviour of the person concerned. He thus justifies the belief, on which psychology and psychoanalysis are based, that mind is not a mystery to which only the owner has privileged access.
Preface; Introduction 1. The Concept of Sensation 2. Privacy and Private Language 3. Self-Knowledge and Personal Identity 4. Knowledge of Other Persons; Concluding Note; Index
Biography
Ashok Vohra
