This book applies institutional theory to the analysis of the post-Soviet Russian economy to bring to light the reasons why reforms have gone awry. Emphasis is put on the elements missed in the early blueprints of reforms: constraints embodied in formal and especially informal institutions. Other aspects considered include the dominant model of power relationships and the networks of localized and personalized relationships among economic actors. The first part provides a general description of the core concepts of institutional theory, including both the 'old' institutionalism of T. Veblen and J. Commons and the 'new' institutional economics of R. Coase, O. Williamson and D. North, and in the second part an institutional model of the post-Soviet Russian economy is developed. In the course of the analysis the authors discuss such unresolved issues as post-privatization development in Russia and validity of the Coase theorem in the post-Soviet institutional context. Rich empirical data grounds the discussion throughout.
Table of Contents
Contents: Preface: Institutional traps in the post-privatization development of the Russian economy, Anton Oleinik. Recent Developments in Institutional Theory: The evolution of institutional theory and its structure, Rustem Nureev; Values, coordination and rationality: the economy of conventions, Laurent Th not, Francois Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, Andre Orl and Robert Salais; Transaction cost economics: from the Coase Theorem to empirical studies, Claude M rd; Theory of optimal contract: modeling contractual relationships, St ane Saussier; Theory of organizations: the diversity of arrangements in a developed market economy, Claude M rd; Institutionalism in a new economic history, Rustem Nureev and Yuri Latov. An Institutional Model of Russian Capitalism: The main institutional models of the emergence and development of capitalism, Rustem Nureev; A model of network capitalism: basic ideas and post-Soviet evidence, Anton Oleinik; A distrustful economy: an inquiry into foundations of the Russian market, Anton Oleinik; Post-Soviet privatization in the light of the Coase Theorem: transaction costs and governance costs, Wladimir Andreff; Russian privatization at bay: some unresolved transaction and governance cost issues in post-Soviet economies, Wladimir Andreff; Institutional analysis of the state, Anton Oleinik; The extralegal economy and the methods for analyzing it, Anton Oleinik; Business groups in Russian industries, Svetlana Avdasheva; Bibliography; Index.