This collection is a pioneering effort to bring together in fruitful interaction the two dominant perspectives on social rules. One, shared by philosophers, lawyers, anthropologists, and sociologists, directly invites formalization by a logic of rules. The other, originating with economists, emphasizes cost considerations and invites mathematical treatment, often in game-theoretical models for problems of coordination?models that some philosophers have taken up as well.Each perspective is represented by new and recent work that moves this important topic toward increased conceptual precision and deeper insight. As a whole, the collection strikes a balance between historical illustrations and theoretical argument, offering in both a rich body of suggestions for further work.
Table of Contents
Preface -- The Logicians' and Philosophers' Approach to Rules -- The Representation of Rules in Logic and Their Definition -- Hyperdeontic Logic: An Overview -- Normative Explanations -- Rules and the Rationality of Scientific Cultures -- Changes of Rules, Issue-Circumscription, and Issue-Processing -- The Nature of Customary Law in the Manor Courts of Medieval England -- Worries About Quandaries -- Rules and Resources: The Legitimation of Political Parties in France and the United States -- Synoptic Comment on Applications of the Logical Theory of Rules -- Transition -- Do We Know Enough About Legal Norms? -- Notes on the Logic of Legal Change -- The Economists' Approach to the Origin of Rules and to Changes in Them -- Comment on Reconciling the Philosophers' Approach to Rules with the Economists' -- Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis -- Conceptions of Social Rule -- The Origin of Rules in Uncertainty -- Rules, Equilibrium, Beliefs, and Social Mathematics -- Epilogue Schematic Synthesis -- Epilogue By Way of Summary: A Schematic Synthesis of the Discussion at the Murphy Institute Conference -- Appendices -- Proofs Realting to Chapter 11 -- Deliberation and Rational Choice (Nicholas Baigent) and Comment -- Deliberation and Rational Choice -- Comment