The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, Crispin Wright, and Jose Zalabardo. The debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following sections in Wittgenstein and his consequent posing of a sceptical paradox that threatens our everyday notions of linguistic meaning and mental content. These essays are attempts to respond to this challenge and represent some of the most important work in contemporary theory of meaning. With an introductory essay and a comprehensive guide to further reading this book is an excellent resource for courses in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, and metaphysics, as well as for all philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists with interests in these areas.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction Alexander Miller 2. Scepticism and semantic knowledge Graeme Forbes 3. The individual strikes back Simon Blackburn 4. Wittgenstein on following a rule John McDowell 5. Wittgenstein, Kripke and nonreductionism about meaning Colin McGinn 6. Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules Warren Goldfarb 7. Critical notice of McGinn's "Wittgenstein on Meaning" Crispin Wright 8. Meaning and intention as judgement-dependent Crispin Wright 9. The rule-following considerations Paul Boghossian 10. The reality of rule-following Philip Pettit 11. Truth rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox Ruth Millikan 12. Kripke on Wittgenstein on normativity George Wilson 13. Meaning, use and truth Paul Horwich 14. Kripke's normativity argument Jose Zalabardo Index