Rational Queueing

Refael Hassin

March 15, 2016 by Chapman and Hall/CRC
Reference - 378 Pages - 12 B/W Illustrations
ISBN 9781498745277 - CAT# K26934
Series: Chapman & Hall/CRC Series in Operations Research

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  • Provides an up-to-date, comprehensive survey of research on the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents all act but often in a noncooperative manner
  • Describes applications in many practical situations, including supply chains, call centers, health systems, communication networks, cloud computing, and the Internet
  • Lists more than 700 papers and contains a detailed index with many cross-references that enable readers to easily locate literature relevant to their topics of interest
  • Presents the material in an easy style with mostly non-technical language, emphasizing models and qualitative insights.
  • Unifies subjects currently published in different disciplines, brings together assorted models and results, and identifies open questions for future research


Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems

Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner.

The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits.

After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents.


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