The conventional wisdomaboutcreditmarketshas been radically alteredin recent years through the introduction of elements of moral hazard,adverseselectionofrisk,and quality-price relationships. Important empiricalstudies have been published which are leading to vastly different policyimplications. This analysis has not been explicitly extended to informalcredit markets so far, although it is widely recognized that credit transactedoutside the banking circuit is quantitatively huge and qualitatively critical,especially in developing countries.This book combines the new theoretical approach to credit markets withcertain precepts of the New Institutional Economics in order to analyzeinformal credit markets. While the formal financial institutions in developingcountries carry out credit transactions within the limits set by the marketenvironment and by government policies, informal institutions evolve by aparticular selection of modes of economic behavior which are responses tointrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal sector enhances trust bymakingexistingtiesanintegralcomponentofcreditcontracts:thecontractualcomponent of informal credit capitalizes on the personalistic (social andeconomic) relationships between the transacting parties.
Table of Contents
List of Tables and Figures -- Foreword, Joseph E. Stiglitz -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Informal Financial Intermediation: A New Institutional Economics Perspective -- 3 Imperfections and Transaction Costs in Credit Markets -- 4 A Model of Informal Credit -- s An Empirical Analysis of Interlinked Credit -- 6 An Empirical Analysis of Sorting Behavior and of Rationing Rules -- 7 Conclusions and Policy Implications -- Appendix: The Survey -- Bibliography -- Index.