Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both.
The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.
Table of Contents
Contents: D. Budescu, I. Erev, R. Zwick, Preface. Part I:On Psychology and Economics. R. Zwick, I. Erev, D. Budescu, The Psychological and Economical Perspective on Human Decisions in Social and Interactive Contexts. R.M. Dawes, Experimental Demand, Clear Incentives, Both, or Neither? Part II:Learning in Experimental Games. C. Camerer, T-H. Ho, Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: Estimates From Weak-Link Games. I. Erev, A.E. Roth, On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game-Theoretic Approach. R. Selten, J. Buchta, Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions With Directly Observed Bid Functions. Part III:Market and Coordination Games. R. Nagel, A Survey on Experimental Beauty Context Games: Bounded Rationality and Learning. J. Ochs, Coordination in Market Entry Games. D.A. Seale, J.A. Sundali, Cheap Talk in a Large Group Coordination Game. Part IV:Bargaining, Fairness, and Equity. G.E. Bolton, Strong and Weak Equity Effects--Evidence, Significance, and Origins. W. Güth, On the Effects of the Pricing Rule in Auction and Fair Division Games--An Experimental Study. E. Weg, R. Zwick, Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games: Theory and Experiments. Part V:Social Dilemmas and Coordination. H. Goren, G. Bornstein, Reciprocation and Learning in the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma Game. S.S. Komorita, C.D. Parks, Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Review and Future Directions. W.B.G. Liebrand, D.M. Messick, Dynamic and Static Theories of Costs and Benefits of Cooperation. C. Snijders, G. Keren, Determinants of Trust. R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu, Common Pool Resource (CPR) Dilemmas With Incomplete Information.
"The book contains well-researched subject and author indexes....the book is highly recommended....The individual chapters are generally of high quality, are well written, describe interesting research, and leave the reader with the impression of a field that is engaged in fruitful discussions."
"After decades of splendid isolation from its sister social sciences, economics is beginning to engage meaningfully again with cognitive and social psychology. The current volume, a festschrift for Amnon Rapoport, is a landmark on the path of reengagement....Progress since the last comparable collection, Hogarth and Reder (1987), is remarkable....The present book reveals a very different and more progressive landscape....Anyone wishing to understand the state of the frontier between economics and psychology in the late 1990s should read this book."